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Abstract
Several empirical studies have found that government expenditures are procycli-
cal in developing countries, unlike the countercyclical expenditures observed in high-
income countries. We develop a dynamic political economy model to explain this phe-
nomenon. In the model, governments provide public insurance to uninsured households,
and Pareto-e¢ cient and time-consistent redistributive policies are countercyclical. The
introduction of a political friction, in which alternating governments disagree on the
desired redistributive policy, can lead to procyclical transfer policies. In numerical sim-
ulations, the model successfully captures the cyclicality of government expenditures,
tax revenues, and decits observed in the data for both high-income and developing
countries. Simulations also allow a quantitative comparison with other common expla-
nations for scal procyclicality. We nd that without the political friction, borrowing
constraints and di¤erences in macroeconomic volatility cannot account for the di¤er-
ences in scal policy across countries in this setting.
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Fiscal policies in almost all high-income countries are countercyclical, reected in counter-
cyclical government expenditures and decits, and procyclical tax revenues.1 Fiscal policies
in developing countries are quite di¤erent. Whether in Latin America (Gavin and Perotti,
1997) or elsewhere in the developing world (Kaminsky, Reinhart and Végh, 2004), govern-
ments tend to spend and borrow more as economic conditions improve. That is, developing
countries conduct procyclical scal policies. The objective of this paper is to propose a the-
ory that can account for the di¤erence between scal policy in high-income and developing
countries.
We begin by rening the observations of the existing literature on the cyclicality of scal
policy. We document that scal policy di¤ers across countries mainly in the cyclicality of
government expenditures, not revenues. Specically, there are indications that government
transfers are the main countercyclical component of spending in high-income countries.
We then propose a model that captures these stylized facts. Because social-insurance
programs make up a large share of government transfers in high-income countries, we model
the cyclical component of government expenditure as the public insurance of uninsured
households, making scal policy countercyclical. We prove that under certain conditions,
Pareto-e¢ cient redistributive policies are countercyclical, with countercyclical transfers and
decits, and procyclical tax rates.
To explain why scal policy di¤ers in developing countries, we introduce a political dis-
tortion, similar to the one studied by Alesina and Tabellini (1990), where alternating gov-
ernments disagree on the desired redistributive policy. We nd that as the degree of political
polarization increases, i.e. the disagreement between successive governments increases, scal
policy becomes more procyclical.
The intuition for these results is simple. Alesina and Tabellini (1990) used a political-
economy model of alternating governments with divergent preferences to show that govern-
ments may over-accumulate debt due to this political friction. If the political environment is
su¢ ciently polarized, the governing partys constituency benets from government spending,
but does not fully internalize the cost of the (current or future) tax burden needed to nance
1Throughout this paper, countercyclicality or scal countercyclicality will refer to the combination of
countercyclical government expenditures, procyclical or acyclical tax rates, and countercyclical decits. Pro-
cyclicality or scal procyclicality will refer to a deviation of any one of these variables from the countercyclical
denition. The assertions in the introduction and Section 1 are based on data from the International Mon-
etary Funds World Economic Outlook database from 1970 to 2003.
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these transfers, because it is borne by the entire polity. We take this logic a step further
and study the cyclical policies arising from this political structure. In our model, a social
planner would choose countercyclical policies: all households prefer to receive countercyclical
transfers to procyclical transfers of the same magnitude, because transfers are valued more
in economic downturns. When the political friction is introduced, the incumbent is uncertain
as to whether his successor will value the same constituency that he does. Thus any savings
a government passes on to its successor may be used to benet a di¤erent political faction.
This induces governments to save less and spend more when more tax revenues are available,
making scal policy procyclical. Governments do so even though their own constituents
would prefer to receive transfers during downturns.
Quantitative simulations of the model show that as the political structure becomes more
polarized, government expenditures become more procyclical and decits less countercyclical,
while tax revenues remain highly procyclical. This captures some cross-sectional features of
the data. In the data, government expenditures are countercyclical in high-income countries,
but procyclical in developing countries. Decits are countercyclical in high-income countries,
but acyclical in the average developing country. Tax revenues are procyclical in both high-
income and developing countries.
Other explanations have been suggested for the phenomenon of scal procyclicality in
developing countries. The most common is that developing countries face tight borrowing
constraints, which limits borrowing during recessions. We question the role of borrowing con-
straints on two counts. First, our model predicts that borrowing constraints are binding and
a¤ect the cyclicality of government expenditure mainly in business cycle downturns. If bor-
rowing constraints were the cause for scal procyclicality, we would expect this phenomenon
to be particularly pronounced in economic downturns. In fact, the cyclicality of government
expenditure observed in the data appears to be symmetric in peaks and troughs. Second,
simulations of the model show that borrowing constraints have no e¤ect on the cyclicality of
scal policy, when the political friction is not present. This result holds although borrowing
constraints are binding in half of the simulation periods.
Others have suggested that scal policy may di¤er across income lines because developing
countries face more volatile income shocks or a more volatile tax base. In contrast, our
model predicts that scal policy will be more countercyclical in more volatile macroeconomic
environments, all else equal. This is because the need for intertemporal insurance is greater
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where the business cycle is more volatile.
Section 1 of this paper presents the basic stylized facts on the cyclicality of scal policy
in high-income and developing countries. A review of the literature follows in Section 2. The
model is presented in Section 3 and is simulated in Section 4, which presents the papers
main results. Section 5 concludes.
1 Stylized Facts
We begin by documenting the stylized facts on the cyclicality of scal policy in high-income
and developing countries. Kaminsky, Reinhart and Végh (2004) have shown that govern-
ment expenditures are countercyclical in high-income countries, but procyclical in developing
countries. Alesina, Campante and Tabellini (2008) also show that expenditures and decits
di¤er greatly in their cyclical properties across countries. This section renes these styl-
ized facts. Figures I-III present the main di¤erences in scal policies across countries. The
most striking di¤erence between scal policies in developing and high-income countries is in
government expenditure, as shown in Figure I. The graph plots the correlation between the
cyclical component of real government expenditures and the cyclical component of real GDP
between the years 1970 and 2003, against PPP GDP per capita in 1970. Cyclical compo-
nents are measured as deviations from the trend, using a Hodrick-Prescott (HP) lter. The
negative correlation between the degree of procyclicality and income per capita is apparent
and is statistically signicant.
It is di¢ cult to assess the cyclicality of tax policies, because time-series data on tax
ratesthe relevant policy variableare unavailable for most developing countries. While there
is anecdotal and indirect evidence that tax rates may be countercyclical in a number of
developing countries (see for example Kaminsky, Reinhart and Végh, 2004), this does not
translate into a di¤erence in the cyclicality of tax revenues. As Figure II shows, the cyclicality
of tax revenues is not correlated with GDP per capita. In fact, the correlation between the
cyclical components of tax revenues and GDP is roughly the same in high income countries
(.44) and developing countries (.43).2
2Income classications by the World Bank began only in 1989, so that it is di¢ cult to assess who would
have qualied as a developing country in 1970 under its classication. In 2007, the World Bank classied
countries with per-capita GDPs of over $11,115 in PPP terms as high-income. Countries meeting this
criterion in 2007 are considered high-income countries in this discussion. In interpreting gures I-III, note
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In high-income countries, the combination of countercyclical government expenditures
and procyclical tax revenues generates unambiguously procyclical surpluses, with an average
correlation of .43 between their cyclical component and the cyclical component of GDP.
Developing countries, whose expenditures and revenues are both procyclical, show great
variance in the cyclicality of their surpluses, as shown in Figure III. Surpluses in developing
countries are acyclical on balance.
The di¤erences in scal policies across income lines appear to be mainly due to variations
in government spending patterns. So far, we have looked at total government expenditure,
which includes government consumption, investment, transfers, and interest payments. It
is interesting to consider the cyclicality of these components. Table I presents the basic
stylized facts. Government investment and consumption are both procyclical in high-income
countries, with correlation coe¢ cients not much di¤erent than in developing countries.3
Interest payments are acyclical, on average, in both income groups.4 The main remaining
component of total government expenditure is transfer payments. Transfer payments would
appear to be the main driver of high-income countriescountercyclical spending patterns.
While data on transfers are unavailable for most developing countries, the last line of Table I
gives some anecdotal evidence. Comparing the cyclicality of social security transfers in high-
income countries to their cyclicality in a number of Latin American economies, we nd that
social security transfers are countercyclical in high-income countries, but procyclical in Latin
America. While social security transfers may not be representative of other types of transfer
payments, it is nevertheless interesting that unlike the other budgetary components listed in
Table I, the cyclicality of social security transfers di¤ers substantially across countries.
Focusing on developing countries, Table II compares the cyclicality of total government
spending during periods that are above the HP lter trend to those that are below the trend.
that countries with per-capita PPP GDPs of over $3000 in 1970 are (with minor exceptions) high-income
countries today.
3This contrasts with Talvi and Veghs (2005) nding that high-income countriesgovernment consump-
tion is acyclical. In any case, their ndings are consistent with the view that transfers are the main coun-
tercyclical component of government spending in high-income countries. Note also that the correlations
reported here are simple bivariate relations. A more sophisticated empirical analysis shows that government
consumption is more procyclical in developing countries than in high-income countries. See Ilzetzki and
Végh (2008) for detailed evidence.
4Data on interest payments is available for only a subset of countries, and for only a subset of the
time period, di¤ering from country to country. The data is also from a di¤erent source, the International
Monetary Funds Government Finance Statistics.
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The di¤erence between these two correlations is not statistically signicant, indicating that
government spending is no less correlated with the business cycle in good times than it is
in bad times. We also look at the correlation of the cyclical components of real government
expenditure and real GDP when excluding crisis years, dened as those years when cyclical
output dropped by more than two standard deviations. As shown in Table II, the procycli-
cality of government expenditure drops by a statistically insignicant margin. In fact, during
several recent output drops of this magnitude (e.g.Turkey in 2001 and Argentina in 2002)
government spending was above-trend, reecting these countriesability to conduct counter-
cyclical policies during some deep recessions. There is no evidence that the procyclicality of
government expenditure is restricted to cyclical downturns, or particularly driven by these
episodes.
So far, we have classied countries based on their per-capita income. The theory that
follows predicts that scal policy will be more procyclical in more polarized political en-
vironments. Using the index of ethnic fractionalization of Alesina et al (2003), Figure IV
shows that government expenditures are more procyclical in countries with more ethnically
fragmented societies. The correlation between the cyclicality of government expenditures
and ethnic fractionalization is .36 and is statistically signicant at the 99 percent condence
level. Similar results hold when using the linguistic fractionalization index, or Easterly and
Levines (1997) measure of ethno-linguistic fragmentation. While there are many other di-
mensions along which a polity can be divided: e.g. regional, ideological, religious, or income,
it is noteworthy that the cyclicality of scal policy is correlated with existing measures of
political polarization.5 Table III presents this stylized fact di¤erently: countries where scal
policy is procyclical are more fragmented along ethnic lines than those conducting coun-
tercyclical policies. The di¤erence is sizable and statistically signicant at the 99 percent
condence level.
2 Literature Review
Gavin and Perotti (1997) and Kaminsky, Reinhart and Végh (2004) provide evidence of the
procyclicality of scal policies in developing countries. Additional empirical work by Lane
5Fiscal policy does not appear to be related to religious fractionalizationan additional measure in the
Alesina et al (2003) database.
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(2003) and Alesina, Campante and Tabellini (2008) shows that political distortions play a
role in explaining scal procyclicality. Studying OECD countries, the former shows that
scal policy is more procyclical in more fragmented political systems. The latter show that
after controlling for a measure of corruption, scal policys cyclicality is no longer correlated
with income per capita. They also show that nancial market frictions have little explanatory
power for the cyclicality of scal policies. We complement this literature by documenting
that the primary scal variable that di¤ers across countries is government expenditure, and
that government transfers appear to be the main source of variation across countries.
A number of explanations have been proposed for the phenomenon of scal procyclicality.
Three factors are prominent in discussions on this topic. First, Gavin and Perotti (1997)
suggest that borrowing constraints in developing countries are the cause for scal procycli-
cality. When borrowing constraints are binding, governments may have no choice but to
rely entirely on tax revenues to nance expenditures. This forces governments to either cut
expenditures or increase taxation in bad times, yielding procyclical scal policies. Riascos
and Végh (2003) and Mendoza and Oviedo (2006) formalize the role of nancial market
imperfections in theoretical models.
Second, it has been suggested that the procyclicality of scal policy in developing coun-
tries may be an optimal reaction to the di¤erent stochastic environments confronting devel-
oping countries. Talvi and Véghs (2005) political-economy model, for example, requires an
interaction between a political distortion and a volatile tax base to generate scal procycli-
cality. In Mendoza and Oviedo (2006), incomplete nancial markets interact with volatile
tax revenues to yield procyclical expenditure policies.
Third, a number of theories suggest that political distortions may cause scal procycli-
cality. The theory in this paper falls into this category. Talvi and Végh (2005) show that
political distortions based on Tornell and Lanes (1999) "voracity e¤ect" may cause procycli-
cal policies. In their Ramsey model of taxation, governments that are unable to run scal
surpluses due to political factors may diverge from the common tax-smoothing prescription.
In contrast to their model, which focuses on the cyclicality of tax policy, our model predicts
di¤erences in government expenditure policies, consistent with the stylized facts presented
in Section 1.
Alesina, Campante and Tabellini (2008) develop a voting model, in which scal procycli-
cality is a side e¤ect of votersattempts to discipline rent-seeking o¢ cials. In their model,
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households demand higher transfers at business cycle peaks, knowing that the government
will extract rents if resources are left idle. The political mechanism underlying the Alesina,
Campante and Tabellini (2008) result is a de-facto dynamic contract between the polity
and rent-seeking politicians. The political structure in our model is di¤erent. There is no
conict of interest between the government and its constituency. Instead, it is successive gov-
ernments that disagree on how to target expenditures. This paper also di¤ers from Alesina,
Campante, and Tabellini (2008) in that we provide a quantitative assessment of our theory.
Battaglini and Coate (2008a, 2008b) study the cyclical properties of scal policy in a
dynamic version of Baron and Ferejohns (1989) legislative bargaining model. Azzimonti,
Battaglini and Coate (2008) analyze this framework quantitatively. In their real business cy-
cle (RBC) framework, Battaglini and Coate (2008b) predict procyclical scal policies. While
the political structure we study is di¤erent from theirs, the underlying political mechanism
is similar. In both cases, the political ine¢ ciency is a dynamic common pool problem. In
our paper, successive governments do not fully internalize the costs of transfers to their con-
stituency, while in Battaglini and Coate (2008a, 2008b) it is legislative coalitions that do not
take in account the social costs of pork barrel spending. Our theory di¤ers from theirs in two
ways. First, Battaglini and Coates (2008a, 2008b) theory is primarily geared to explaining
scal policies in the United States and countries with similar political structures. Here, we
are interested in comparisons of scal policy across countries. Also, in Battaglini and Coate
(2008a, 2008b), households are risk neutral, so that their framework gives no reason why
scal policies may ever be countercyclical. In fact, in Battaglini and Coate (2008b), gov-
ernment expenditures are procyclical regardless of whether the political distortion is present
or not. In our model, the ruling party faces a trade-o¤ between its constituentsdesire for
countercyclical policies with its desire to discipline its successors.
This paper provides a political economy explanation for scal procyclicality, but also
makes a unique contribution to the literature by presenting a macroeconomic model that
allows for all three proposed explanations for scal procyclicality and that lends itself to a
comparative quantitative analysis of the three theories.
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3 The Model
Consider a small open economy consisting of a measure-one continuum of households. House-
holds are indexed by i, and each household permanently belongs to one of two groups, A and
B, of measures  and 1    , respectively. Households are identical in every other respect.
They value consumption, cit, and dislike supplying hours worked, h
i
t. The only source of
exogenous uncertainty is the wage process wt; with support [w¯
; w¯]. Wages follow a Markov
process, so that the probability of a wage draw wt+1 is a function of wt alone.
Consumers choose their labor contribution and consumption in each period. They do
not have access to capital markets. This is a simple way to motivate government insurance
for the private sector. The government uses its ability to borrow and save in international
capital markets to provide intertemporal insurance for consumers.
Modeling scal policy in such a way has several advantages. First, we have seen that the
main source of countercyclicality in the spending behavior of governments in high-income
countries is government transfers, of which social insurance programs are a large component.
Second, scal policy used for this purpose will tend to be countercyclical. This biases the
model against procyclical policies, a bias the political distortion we introduce will need to
overcome. Finally, as documented in Claessens (2006), lack of access to nancial markets is
both prevalent and an important source of vulnerability in developing countries.6
The government chooses a uniform, proportional tax rate  t: It cannot discriminate be-
tween the two groups A and B in its tax policy. It can, however, provide group-specic
transfers T it  0 to one or more of the groups. It must also spend an exogenously xed and
constant amount on government consumption g.7 Since government consumption is acycli-
cal by assumption, total government expenditure, Gt = g +  TAt + (1   )TBt ; is perfectly
correlated with total transfers in the model. The government enters a period inheriting
a level of non-state-contingent debt bt 1 and chooses
n
 t; fT it gi2fA;Bg ; bt
o
to maximize the
weighted welfare of consumers, depending on the governments social welfare function, which
6Claessens (2006) reports that less than half of the population uses formal nancial institutions to save
in most developing countries. The proportion of the population with savings accounts is in some cases lower
than 10%. Even in the United States, close to 10% of the population reported not holding any type of
transaction account in 2001.
7Government consumption plays no role in this model and setting g = 0 does not a¤ect any of the results
herein. It is useful to include g for quantitative simulations of the model, where g is chosen to match the
average level of government consumption observed in the data.
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varies between specications of the model. The government can borrow and save freely in
international capital markets at an exogenous and constant interest rate r.8 Debt contracts
are fully enforceable; we abstract from the question of sovereign default in this discussion.
3.1 Households
A representative household in group i chooses consumption and hours worked in each period
to maximize lifetime utility. Its preferences over consumption and hours worked are:
E0
1X
t=0
t~u
 
cit; h
i
t

;
where period utility takes the form proposed by Greenwood, Hercowitz and Hu¤man (1988).
~u (c; h) =

c  h1+1="
1+1="
1 
1   :
These preferences are useful for our purposes. Labor supply decisions are not dependent on
householdswealth, which increases analytical tractability. This also implies that transfers
T it are not distortionary, while taxes  t a¤ect the labor supply decisions of households in
both groups.
Household i chooses cit and h
i
t in each period to maximize its lifetime utility subject to
its budget constraint:
cit = (1   t)wthit + T it (1)
Given that households have no access to credit markets, their optimization problem is static
in each period, yielding the following labor-supply schedule:
ht = h
i
t = [(1   t)wt]" 8i: (2)
The rst equality reects that labor contributions are uniform across household types.
Substituting (1) and (2) into householdspreferences, we obtain the following indirect
8Introducing a time-varying interest rate may in itself a¤ect the cyclicality of scal variables, depending
on the cyclicality of governments borrowing rate. Allowing for an interest rate schedule that is increasing
in the governments outstanding debt does not a¤ect any of the papers results.
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period utility function:
u
 
T it ;  t

=
h
[(1  t)wt]"+1
"+1
+ T it
i1 
1   :
The marginal utility of the transfer payment is equal to the marginal utility of consumption,
which we denote
it  ~uic = uiT =
"
[(1   t)wt]"+1
"+ 1
+ T it
# 
: (3)
The marginal (dis-) utility of taxes is
ui =  w"+1t (1   t)" it: (4)
3.2 Pareto Frontier
We now explore scal policy set by a government with an innite horizon and preferences that
are constant over time. Let  and 1  denote the weights that the government places on the
welfare of group A and B, respectively. By altering the value of , we can map the economys
Pareto frontier. Di¤erent preference weights may reect di¤erent redistributive motives for
scal policy. We are not interested here in the possible motivations for scal redistribution.
Rather, we show that Pareto-e¢ cient redistributive policies will yield countercyclical scal
policies in this framework, regardless of the redistributive motivation. In Section 3.3 we will
look at a political friction that may explain the procyclical scal patterns observed in some
countries. The analysis of this section indicates that such procyclical policies are ine¢ cient
in the Pareto sense.
Pareto-e¢ cient policies are characterized by the following maximization problem:
max
fT itgi2fA;Bg; t;bt
Et
1X
s=t
s

u
 
TAs ;  s

+ (1  )u  TBs ;  s
s.t.
bt + w
"+1
t  t (1   t)"   TAt + (1   )TB + (1 + r) bt 1 + g; (5)
where  twtht = w"+1t  t (1   t)" are government revenues. This maximization problem is
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also subject to the following non-negativity constraint on transfers,
T it  0 8i; (6)
imposed to ensure that the government does not use negative transfers as targeted lump-
sum taxes. Finally, the government faces a borrowing constraint. This constraint may be
an exogenous constraint on borrowing, or one that limits the government to borrow no more
than it can repay almost surelyan adaptation of Aiyagaris (1994) natural debt limit. The
natural debt limit constrains the government to hold no more debt than can be repaid if
it faces the lowest possible wage realization in every subsequent period, while taxing at the
peak of the La¤er curve. The revenue-maximizing tax rate is the constant:
Laffer  1
"+ 1
:9
It is never optimal for the government to to choose a tax rate that exceeds this rate, as there
is always a lower tax rate that generates the same amount of revenues at a lower utility cost
to all households. Using this result, the borrowing constraint can be written as:
bt  min

b;w
¯
"+1 "
"
r ("+ 1)"+1

; (7)
where b is an ad-hoc exogenous borrowing constraint and the second term is the natural debt
limit.
The rst order conditions of the governments maximization problem yield two conditions.
The rst is an intratemporal optimality condition reecting the trade-o¤ between taxes and
transfers:
1   t   " t
1   t = 1 
X
i2fA;Bg
it
t
; (8)
where t is the multiplier on the governments budget constraint and it are the multipliers
on the two non-negativity constraints for transfers, T it . The left hand side of this equation
9This is the solution to the unconstrained revenue maximization problem:
max

w"+1 (1  )"  :
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gives the reciprocal of the marginal cost of public funds.10 Raising one unit of revenues costs
the private sector 1  t
1  t " t  1 units of private consumption, due to the taxesdistortionary
e¤ect on the supply of labor. The right hand side gives the reciprocal of the marginal benet
of total transfers. When both groups receive transfers, the marginal benet of one unit of
transfers is equal to one. When it = 0 8i, (8) gives  t = 0, giving the intuitive result that
it is ine¢ cient to use distortionary taxation to provide lump-sum transfers to both groups
simultaneously. The second optimality condition is a standard Euler equation, written here
for a period when the borrowing constraint is slack:
t =  (1 + r)Ett+1 (9)
Pareto e¢ cient policies can be characterized by dividing the state-space into three regions,
reecting three possible scal regimes. First, whenever it = 0 8i, we have a government
that can nance its required level of public consumption g and achieve its desired income
distribution without resorting to taxation ( t = 0). This occurs only when the governments
assets are su¢ ciently high (b << 0) and could represent a government that has accumulated
a large Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF). From a theoretical perspective, this resembles the
asymptotic results in Aiyagari et al (2002), where the government eventually accumulates
su¢ cient assets to nance required expenditures without the need for distortionary taxation.
Indeed, if  (1 + r) = 1, scal policy converges almost surely to this regime.
Second, if it > 0 8i, the government does not provide transfers to either group. This
could represent a government in a Fiscal Crisis: if debt is su¢ ciently high, the government
uses all its tax revenues to service its debt and to nance required government consumption,
and does not provide transfers to either of the two groups (T it = 0 8i).11
Third, we refer to states of nature where 9i such that it = 0 and  it > 0 (with  i
representing the group other than i) as the Redistributive Fiscal Policy regime. Without
loss of generality, let A be the recipients of the transfer payment, and let TBt = 0. The rst
10See Battaglini and Coate (2008b) for further discussion on the marginal cost of public funds.
11The transfer payments may both also be zero if the government has no redistributive objective, so that
 =  .
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order conditions of the governments maximization problem then imply:
A
B

1  "
(1  ) (1   )

=
(1  ) = (1   )
= 
(10)
Recalling that it is the marginal utility of consumption for a household in group i, this
equation states that the government can fully obtain its desired income distribution only
when  = 0. When  > 0 the government provides less of the transfer TAt than would be
necessary to achieve its desired income distribution, as it internalizes the welfare cost of
distortionary taxation.
We now turn to the main result of this section, namely that Pareto-e¢ cient scal policy
exhibits a countercyclical pattern, with countercyclical transfers and debt and procyclical
tax rates. The proof of this proposition is in Appendix 6.1.
Proposition 1 (Pareto-e¢ cient scal policy) Assuming i.i.d. shocks and
 (1 + r) < 1,Pareto-e¢ cient scal policy is countercyclical in the following sense:
(1) Debt is decreasing in wages in all three regimes
(2) Transfers are decreasing in wages in the SWF regime.
(3) Tax rates (and revenues) are increasing in wages in the Fiscal Crisis regime.
(The results are comparative statics results.)
We are unable to provide a general proof on the cyclicality of taxes and transfers for
the Redistributive regime as well, but we were unable to nd parametrizations where scal
policy is not countercyclical in this regime. We now provide intuition why one might expect
scal policy to be countercyclical in the Redistributive regime. Similar intuition holds in the
other two regimes, for which a formal proof is given in Proposition 1.
As before, letA be the recipients of the transfer payment. Observe that the Euler equation
(9) contains tthe multiplier on governments budget constraint. But the governments rst
order conditions also combine to give:
At =  (1 + r)Et
A
t+1; (11)
so that the government uses transfers to smooth transfer recipientsmarginal utility of con-
sumption. For group B, matters are more complicated. Households in this group do not
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receive transfers, so consumption smoothing can only be achieved by altering the tax rate.
This conicts with the governments desire to smooth distortionary taxes over time. The
following equation, resulting from the governments rst order conditions, reects this ten-
sion:
Bt
(1   t)
(1   t) (1   )  " t =  (1 + r)Et

Bt+1
(1   t+1)
(1   t+1) (1   )  " t+1

: (12)
Smoothing tax distortions ( 1  t
(1  t)(1  ) " t ) requires acyclical tax rates, but smoothing the
marginal utility of consumption Bt =
h
[(1  t)wt]"+1
"+1
i 
requires procyclical taxes rates. The
resulting policy will be of mildly procyclical tax rates, compromising between smoothing
the tax rate and smoothing the marginal utility of consumption for households in group
B. Given that tax policy alone does not fully smooth marginal utility, (11) requires that
transfers TA be countercyclical, where recall that At 
h
[(1  t)wt]"+1
"+1
+ TAt
i 
.
These results highlight the mystery of procyclical scal policies observed in some coun-
tries. Abstracting from any Keynesian motivation for countercyclical scal policies, we still
nd that Pareto-e¢ cient redistributive policies are countercyclical. Section 3.3 presents a
dynamic political economy model that attempts to explain why ine¢ cient redistribution
policies may occur. First, however, we explore the role of borrowing constraints. It has
been conjectured that nancial market frictions, such as borrowing constraints, could be the
cause for procyclical policies. It is worth determining whether a simple borrowing constraint
could generate scal procyclicality before resorting to political economy explanations for the
phenomenon.
Borrowing Constraints
Could borrowing constraints explain the procyclicality of scal policy? In this framework,
it appears that borrowing constraints are at best a partial answer. The following proposition,
whose proof is in Appendix 6.2, states that borrowing constraints will be binding for low
realizations of the wage shock.
Proposition 2 (Borrowing Constraints) Assume that shocks are i.i.d. For a given level
of inherited debt bt 1, if borrowing constraints are binding for some wage realizations, and
slack for other wage realizations, there exists a cuto¤ wage ~w (bt 1), below which borrowing
constraints are binding and above which borrowing constraints are slack.
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Thus, if borrowing constraints are the main cause of scal procyclicality, we would expect
scal procyclicality to be observed mainly during economic downturns. The stylized facts
of Section 1 show that the procyclicality of government expenditure is not restricted to
economic downturns. It is hard to explain the procyclicality of scal policy during economic
booms with borrowing constraints alone.
Simulations of the model in Section 4 show that in a dynamic context, the presence of
borrowing constraints does not appear to a¤ect the cyclicality of scal policy, unless the
political distortion of the following section is also present. Even when borrowing constraints
frequently bind, procyclical government expenditures are not observed.
3.3 Political Economy Distortions
We now consider a political friction where two political factions disagree on the weights
they place on the welfare of di¤erent groups in the economy. The control of the government
evolves stochastically over time, with p denoting the probability that an incumbent remains
in power in the following period and 1   p that the incumbent is replaced with the other
political faction or party. This alternating-government structure has been used in a number
of political economy models. Alesina and Tabellini (1990) study how political distortions
a¤ect steady state decits. They nd that both the frequency of political turnover and
the degree of political polarization increase the steady state level of debt. Amador (2003)
uses this framework to show that political distortions may help sustain agreement between a
sovereign debtor and international creditors. Azzimonti (2005) uses this framework to explain
the under-accumulation of capital in developing countries. Her study also contributes to this
literature by showing that this simple alternating-government framework follows from a
model with political microfoundations based on Lindbeck and Weibulls (1993) probabilistic
voting model. She shows that as long as neither party has a structural electoral advantage,
the probability of re-election p will be constant across time, even if voters take the state
of the economy into consideration in their electoral decisions. While the terminology used
here implies a democratic transition of government, transitions of power between conicting
ethnic, ideological, or interest groups occur in non-democracies as well, so that the theory
presented here need not restrict our discussion to democracies alone.
There are two political parties A and B. Each values the welfare of half the population.
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The two parties alternate in power, with p denoting the probability that the incumbent
remains in power in the following period. Each party maximizes a social welfare function that
places an equal weight on the welfare of each member of its constituency.12 The constituencies
of the two parties may be partially overlapping, with  2 [0; 1] denoting the fraction of
each constituency that also belongs to the constituency of the other party. In other words,
the constituency of a given party is of measure 1
2
, with measure 
2
also included in the
constituency of the other party, while measure 1 
2
is uniquely in the constituency of the
rst party. A measure 1   
2
of the population is unrepresented. There is disagreement
between the two parties as to the desired redistributive policy, with  reecting the degree
of agreement or cohesion between the two political factions. Conversely, we can think of
(1  ) as the degree of political polarization.13
The governing party maximizes a social welfare function that puts equal weights on each
constituent household. The welfare function is normalized by the size of the constituency.
V (bt 1; wt) represents the highest value that the governing party can achieve when entering
period t with an inherited debt stock of bt 1 and a wage rate of wt:
V (b; w) = max
;T;b0
u (T; ) +  [pEV (b0; w0) + (1  p)EW (b0; w0)] (13)
subject to
b0 + w"+1 (1  )" = T
2
+ (1 + r) b+ g; (14)
T  0; (15)
where T represents the units of the consumption good transferred to a household in the
ruling partys constituency. b  bt 1, b0  bt; and w0  wt+1. Time t subscripts have
been suppressed elsewhere. The value of being in opposition, with the oppositions welfare
12The measure 1=2 constituency size is without loss of generality. Simulations of the model show that
increases in constituency size and increases in political cohesion, to be discussed shortly, have similar e¤ects.
13This is similar, but not identical to the denition of polarization in Alesina and Tabellini (1990). There,
both parties place a positive weight on the welfare of all households, but disagree on the weights.  2  12 ; 1
is the weight a party puts on its preferred constituency, with 1    giving the weight on the oppositions
constituency. The closer  is to 1, the more polarized is the polity. In our setting,  2 [0; 1] is the percentage
of the incumbents constituency that is also in the oppositions constituency. Here, political polarization
is decreasing in . Both structures yield qualitatively similar results. However the notation used here
simplies analysis by eliminating the "Sovereign Wealth Fund" regime described in the previous section. It
also simplies notation since each incumbent only transfers to its own constituency and we do not have to
keep track of the value of two transfer payments.
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function dened similarly, is
W (b; w) = u (T  (b; w) ;   (b; w)) + (1  )u (0;   (b; w)) (16)
+ [(1  p)EV (b (b; w) ; w0) + pEW (b (b; w) ; w0)] ;
where T  (b; w),   (b; w) and b (b; w) are the transfer, tax, and debt policies, respectively,
chosen by the incumbent. This equation reects that a measure 
2
of the oppositions con-
stituency also belongs to the incumbents constituency, while the remaining portion 1 
2
receives no transfer.
The rst order conditions of the governments maximization problem can be reduced to
two equations. The rst reects intratemporal optimization in the choice of the tax rate and
transfer payment:
1
2
=
1     "
1   +


; (17)
where  and  are the Lagrange multipliers on the governments budget constraint and the
non-negativity constraint on transfers, respectively. This equation implies a baseline tax rate
T whenever the transfer payment is provided (so that  = 0):
T  1
1 + 2"
:
(17) makes it clear that the tax rate may exceed its baseline level during a scal crisis, when
 > 0. The second equation is an intertemporal optimality condition, reecting the optimal
choice of government debt:
 +  [pEVb (b
0; w0) + (1  p)EWb (b0; w0)] = 0; (18)
where intratemporal optimality implies that
 =
1  
1     "
"
[(1  )w]"+1
"+ 1
+ T
# 
: (19)
It is tempting at this stage to use the envelope theorem to solve for EVb (b0; w0) and
EWb (b
0; w0) in (18). However, note that (16) is not a maximization problem, so that the
envelope theorem cannot be applied to this equation.
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To make further progress in analyzing the dynamics of the model, we need to rene
the equilibrium concept used in the solution. Amador (2003) shows that a similar political
structure resembles a the consumption-savings problem of a hyperbolic consumer. Krusell
and Smith (2003) show that the savings-consumption problem of a hyperbolic consumer
may have multiple equilibria, or even a continuum of equilibria. To address this problem,
we follow Krusell, Kuruscu and Smith (2002) in focusing on a specic type of equilibrium
path. First, we restrict attention to Symmetric Markov Perfect Equilibria, where govern-
mentspolicy choice is a function only of the current state fbt 1; wtg and both parties choose
the same policy (except for the identity of transfer recipients) in a given state of nature.
Second, we restrict attention to di¤erentiable policy functions. In our context this implies
a di¤erentiable function b0 = f (b; w), giving a governments choice of debt.14 We can now
dene the Di¤erentiable Equilibrium.
Denition 1 (Di¤erentiable Equilibrium) A Di¤erentiable Equilibrium is dened as two
value functions: V (b; w) and W (b; w) and three policy functions: T (b; w),  (b; w) ; and
f (b; w), such that given a stochastic process for fwtg1t=0 :
(1) Given V (b; w) and W (b; w), T (b; w),  (b; w) ; and f (b; w) solve the maximization prob-
lem in equations (13) to (15), for the variables T ,  , and b0, respectively.
(2)Given T (b; w),  (b; w) ; and f (b; w), V (b; w) and W (b; w) satisfy the functional equa-
tions (13) and (16), respectively.
(3) f (b; w) is di¤erentiable in its rst argument for 8 fb; wg for which T (b; w) = 0 and
 (b; w) = T , do not both hold.
We now characterize the Di¤erentiable Equilibrium. The analysis proceeds as follows.
We di¤erentiate the value functions V (b; w) and W (b; w) with respect to b. Rather than
using the envelope theorem in this di¤erentiation, we have each party taking as given the
policy function f (b; w) of next periods incumbent when evaluating the marginal (dis-)utility
of debt accumulation. This gives us the following Generalized Euler Equation (GEE), whose
14There is a subtle di¤erence between our problem and that of Krusell, Kuruscu and Smith (2002). It
is unclear whether a policy function f (b; w) that is di¤erentiable over the entire state space exists. It is
apparent, for example, that the policy functions T (b; w) and  (b; w) are non-di¤erentiable at the transition
from the Redistributive regime to the Fiscal Crisis regime. It is su¢ cient for our purposes to assume a
policy function f (b; w) that is di¤erentiable everywhere except in the set on fb; wg that results in T = 0 and
 = T .
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derivation is given in Appendix 6.3.
 =  (1 + r)
Z
w0jT 0=0
0dw0 + (p+  (1  p))
Z
w0jT 0>0
0dw0

(20a)
+ (1  p)
24 (1  p)  (1 + r)E [00fb (b0; w0)] 

R
w0jT 0>0 fb (b
0; w0) 0dw0 +
R
w0jT 0=0 fb (b
0; w0) 0dw0
 35 (20b)
 p fp (1 + r)E [00fb (b0; w0)]  E [0fb (b0; w0)]g ; (20c)
where the integrals are over values of w0, for which T 0 = 0 (Fiscal Crisis)or T 0 > 0 (Redis-
tributive Regime). The intuition of this intertemporal condition is as follows. Recalling that
 is the Lagrange multiplier on the governments budget constraint,  is the marginal cost
of reducing government debt by one unit, as valued by the incumbent. The benet of this
extra unit of savings is given by the right hand side of (20a). This extra unit of savings will
be available to next periods incumbent. In all states of nature for which T 0 = 0 there is no
disagreement between the two parties and the marginal dollar saved will be used optimally
from the perspective of the current government, regardless of who his successor is. On the
other hand, in all states of nature for which T 0 > 0 these savings will have no marginal
benet for households who do not receive transfers. With probability p the incumbent will
be in o¢ ce in the following period. With probability 1  p the incumbent is out of o¢ ce in
the following period, and only a fraction  of the incumbents constituency (those who also
belong to the oppositions constituency) will benet from the marginal dollar saved. This
explains (20a).
However, the incumbent and his successor disagree on the optimal choice of debt two
periods ahead: f (b0; w0) : In case the incumbent loses o¢ ce, he would like to inuence his
successors borrowing choice. This e¤ect is captured by (20b). With probability 1   p the
incumbent loses power. fb (b0; w0) is the extent to which a additional dollar saved by the
period t incumbent inuences his successor in period t + 1 to save an additional dollar for
period t + 2. With probability (1  p)2 the incumbent will regain power two periods from
now. And to the extent that an additional dollar of savings today induces the successor to
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roll over some of the savings to the following periodgiving a return to savings of fb (b0; w0)
this gives the period t + 2 government a marginal benet of 00. At the same time, these
induced savings come at the expense of transfer recipients (or of the entire population in a
Fiscal Crisis) in period t+1. Thus, the incumbent takes into the account the cost of inducing
his successor to increase savings at time t + 1, in terms of transfer losses to a fraction  of
his constituency in the Redistributive regime, or his entire constituency in a scal crisis.
There are also higher order e¤ects. The incumbents attempt to inuence his successor
distorts his own decisions in the following period, if he retains power. (20c) gives the costs of
self-induced over-saving if incumbent remains in power, caused by his attempts to inuence
his successors behavior, in turnover does occur.
Making further progress in analyzing the cyclicality of scal policy in this model requires
numerical methods, to which we turn in Section 4. However, the basic intuition of the source
of scal procyclicality is simple. While both partiesconstituencies would prefer to receive
countercyclical transfers, the parties cannot rely on their successors to allocate savings in a
way that benets them. This conict of interests exists to the extent that both (1) there is
government turnover (p < 1) and (2) there is disagreement as to who should receive transfers
( < 1). It is easy to see that the GEE is consistent with a standard Euler equation like
(9), when either  = 1 or p = 1. If disagreement between the parties is su¢ ciently small,
the likelihood of reelection is high, or the likelihood of being in a scal crisis in the following
period is su¢ ciently high, the government uses the high revenue income resulting from a
positive productivity shock to decrease the outstanding stock of debt. It also decreases the
magnitude of the transfer payment to households, as their income is positively a¤ected by the
shock. This gives the government scal room to increase transfer payments during economic
downturns. However, if the government is unlikely to retain power and there is signicant
disagreement between the parties, the government will not nd it as benecial to reduce
the stock of outstanding debt, because the scal room provided by the lower debt stock will
mainly benet a constituency other than its own. The government then nds it optimal to
transfer a signicant fraction of this periods high revenues to its constituents, fearing that
the opposition will do the same if in power in the following period.
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4 Numerical Simulation
This section conducts a quantitative analysis of the models dynamics. The time inconsis-
tency inherent in the political structure of the model poses some computational challenges.
In the previous section we follow Krusell, Kuruscu and Smith (2002) and Klein, Krusell and
Rios-Rull (2003) in restricting attention to equilibrium paths with di¤erentiable policy func-
tions. As in these papers, standard computational methods do not perform well, presumably
due to the modelsmultiple equilibria. The governments optimization problem is not a con-
traction, and iterations on the value function do not necessarily converge. On the other
hand, the perturbation method suggested by Krusell, Kuruscu and Smith (2002) cannot be
applied in our context, because the non-negativity constraint on transfers creates kinks in
the policy functions. The computational algorithm, described in Appendix 6.3, therefore
uses nite-horizon backward induction. We solve a nite-horizon variant of the model with
t = 10; 000 periods (years). Increasing the time horizon up to one million periods did not
a¤ect simulation results. There is no guarantee that this nite-horizon analysis resembles
the Di¤erentiable Equilibrium that was analyzed in Section 3.3. However, Krusell, Kuruscu
and Smith (2002) show that the Di¤erentiable Equilibrium is the limit of a nite horizon
problem, in their context. We therefore expect that the numerical solution presented in this
section would yield an accurate approximation of Di¤erentiable Equilibrium at the innite
horizon limit.
4.1 Parametrization
It is easy to show that the introduction of a constant-returns-to-scale rm using labor as its
only input would have wages perfectly correlated with an exogenous productivity shock. We
assume that the productivity shock follows a lognormal process, so that wt = ezt, where zt
is a random variable, following an AR(1) process:
zt   z =  (zt 1   z) + t: (21)
Here z is the trend level of productivity, which is normalized to 0;  is the autocorrelation
coe¢ cient; and t is an i.i.d shock normally distributed with mean 0 and variance 2.
The model is simulated in three environments. First, parameter values are chosen to
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match the business cycle features of the United States. Second, the model is simulated with
the business cycle features of the United States and with borrowing constraints. An extreme
borrowing limit is imposed: the government may only save, and may not hold any amount
of external debt, so that b = 0. In other simulations, b is set to the natural debt limit, as in
(7). Third, we parametrize the model to match the business cycle features of Argentina, as
an example of an emerging market economy.
Parameter values are summarized in Table IV. For the U.S., we choose the values of
f; 2g typically used in the RBC literature, in order to isolate the e¤ects of political phe-
nomena. Given that the model is simulated at annual frequency, this yields  = 0:81 and
 = 0:0144. As is common in the RBC literature for developing countries, and as suggested
by Mendoza (1995), we parametrize the model with Argentinas business cycle features us-
ing terms of trade as the exogenous shock. Using the International Monetary Funds (IMF)
World Economic Outlook (WEO) data for the period 1970-2003, Argentinas shock process
can be thus be represented as  = 0:56 and  = 0:079. These values are also very similar to
estimates obtained when looking at the actual output process of Argentina, as in Arellano
(2008), for example. This implies a business cycle that is signicantly more volatile than
in the U.S. We nd that the other di¤erences between the values of economic parameters
of the U.S. and Argentina do not have signicant e¤ects on the cyclicality of scal policy
in the model, so that the main role of the "Argentina" simulations is to assess the role of
di¤erences in business cycle volatility.
We set risk aversion to  = 2, as is common in the literature. The elasticity of labor
supply is set to " = 1:7. This is the value used in Greenwood, Hercowitz and Hu¤man
(1988).
For our benchmark simulation, we set the real interest rate to r = 2:4%, the average
ex-post real return on 10-year Treasury bonds from 1970 to 2003 (nominal returns and
ination taken from the International Monetary Funds International Financial Statistics).
Determining an exogenous average borrowing rate for Argentina is trickier. Spreads on
Argentine sovereign bonds have ranged from 300 to 6000 basis points in recent years. When
rates are as prohibitive as at the higher end of this range, it is hard to separate the borrowing
rate from a de-facto constraint on external borrowing. Moreover, borrowing rates are likely
endogenous to the governments policy choices. Empirical evidence on sovereign spreads in
Latin America show that 400 basis points is a typical spread (see for example Table 3 in
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Eichengreen and Mody, 1998). Based on this evidence we set r = 6:4%. We have simulated
the model for a wide range of interest rates; none of the results presented here are particularly
sensitive to the specic borrowing rate chosen, or to the introduction of a debt-elastic interest
rate schedule.
While the political friction introduces a degree of myopia, the benchmark simulations
without the political friction would be non-stationary if  = 1 + r: We therefore choose 
to match the debt-to-GDP ratios of the United States and Argentina. This gives  = :976
for the U.S. and  = :934 for Argentina. We set the ratio of government consumption to
average GDP g=GDP to its average level between 1970 and 2003, based on WEO data. This
average ratio is 11% for the United States and 4.5% for Argentina.
Turning to political parameters, we leave political cohesion  as a free parameter. How-
ever, for ease of presentation, we choose benchmark values for p and look at the e¤ects of
changes in  for a given level of p. We later revisit the interaction between the two political
parameters. We choose values of p that match the turnover rate in the two countries. In the
United States, the observed likelihood that the incumbent party retains the presidency in
an election year was 0:64 in the 20th century. Adjusting this to reect the annual frequency
of the model gives p = 0:9. In Argentina, government turnover is more irregular, and Ar-
gentina was a non-democracy for parts of the 20th century. Also, the volatile party structure
in Argentina makes it di¢ cult at times to determine whether a given party represents the
same economic interests as its successors. A casual reading of Argentine presidential history
indicates that the probability that a given political faction remains in power in a given year
is approximately 0:8, whether the government is replaced through elections or force. As we
will see, the simulations qualitative results are not sensitive to the specic choice of p.
4.2 Results
Figures V-VII present the main simulation results. The solid curves represent the correlation
between a given scal variable and GDP in three sets of simulations, each across a range of
values of  (political cohesion). The correlations are computed using the deviations of the
simulated time series from their HP lter trend. Simulations are of 1000 periods, with the
rst 900 discarded to minimize the e¤ects of initial conditions.
The curves intersection with the y axis are results of the benchmark specication, in
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which  = 1, so that there is full agreement between political parties and no political
distortion is present. To facilitate comparison with the data, the actual correlation between
(the cyclical components of) GDP and government expenditure in the U.S. and Argentina
are shown in dotted lines. Figure V gives results for the correlation between government
expenditures and GDP. Figure VI shows the correlations between tax revenues and GDP.
Figure VII shows the correlations between the decit and GDP.
When parametrized with the business cycle features of the United States, the model
predicts highly countercyclical government expenditures and decits when no political dis-
tortion is present. The model requires only a small degree of political polarization (0:95 for
expenditures and 0:8 for decits) to match the features of U.S. data. Moving along the x
axis, as political polarization increases, government spending becomes less countercyclical,
and eventually procyclical. Decits become less countercyclical, and eventually acyclical,
as political polarization increases. The model can thus explain the fact that government
expenditures and decits are countercyclical in countries that are more politically cohesive,
but procyclical and acyclical, respectively, in more polarized political environments.
Consistent with the data, the model shows highly procyclical revenues with little di¤er-
ences across countries. At the same time, the correlation of government revenues with GDP
in the model is almost always very close to 1. This is a feature of many models with linear
income taxes, because the tax base is highly procyclical. In this model, simulated tax rates
do become more countercyclical as  decreases, but this does not have a sizeable e¤ect on
the cyclicality of revenues.
When the model is parametrized with the business cycle features of Argentina, the re-
sults are qualitatively similar. Without the political distortion, government expenditures are
strongly countercyclical, as in the "U.S." simulation. In fact, except for extremely polarized
political environments ( < 0:3) the model predicts policies that are more countercyclical
in the volatile Argentine environment. This is because the need for intertemporal insur-
ance for households increases with higher business-cycle volatility. The model matches the
observed correlation between government expenditure and GDP in the Argentine data for
 = 0:6. The model has greater di¢ culty in matching the observed cyclicality of decits
in Argentina. The conclusion emerging from this set of simulations is that we would ex-
pect more countercyclical scal policies in more volatile business cycle environments, all else
equal.
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In the third round of simulations, we tightened borrowing constraints, so that govern-
ments have no access to borrowing. They can, however, save freely at the exogenous interest
rate r. Figures V-VII show that borrowing constraints have no e¤ect on the cyclicality
of scal policy unless the political friction is also present. In the benchmark simulations
( = 1) government expenditures and decits remain highly countercyclical, even though
borrowing constraints were binding in 50% of the simulated periods. Interestingly, borrowing
constraints do appear to reinforce procyclical expenditures and decits, when the political
friction is present. This indicates that political and nancial market frictions might reinforce
each other, but we do not nd support for the idea that borrowing constraints alone play an
important role in explaining scal procyclicality
Figure VIII shows the interaction between the two political parameters. It shows sim-
ulation results for "Argentina" for a variety of p values (the probability of the incumbent
remaining in power in the following period), with  (political cohesion) changing along the
x axis. According to the World Banks Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al, 2001),
few countries have had annual turnover rates higher than 30% in annual frequency, implying
a value of p = 0:7. We look at values of p ranging from 0:5 to 0:95, keeping in mind that the
lower end of this range implies unrealistically high turnover relative to the rates observed
in the data. Not surprisingly, we nd that higher turnover (lower p) causes scal policy to
become more procyclical.
Figure VIII also demonstrates the utility of quantitative analysis in the understanding
of political economy phenomena. Alesina and Tabellini (1990) predict that government
indebtedness increases in both turnover (1   p) and political polarization (1   ). Here,
too, both parameters are necessary conditions for distorted policies to appear. However,
model simulations highlight that while political polarization uniformly a¤ects the cyclicality
of government expenditures for any value of p 2 (0; 1), political turnover has little e¤ect on
the cyclicality of scal policy in cohesive political environments (high levels of ). Even with
turnover more frequent than observed in reality, the cyclicality of government expenditures
remains virtually unchanged for values of  > 0:9. Thus a cohesive polity can expect to
benet from e¢ cient scal policies even when turnover is frequent. At the same time, a
dictator ruling over a polarized society might conduct distorted scal policies, as long as
there is some positive probability that an opposing faction will seize power in the future.
These are good news for proponents of democratic forms of government.
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We can summarize the models predictions arising from simulations as follows. Without
the political distortion, scal policy is countercyclical, reected in procyclical tax revenues,
and countercyclical expenditures and decits. This is true even in volatile macroeconomic
environments, and even when borrowing constraints are frequently binding. The introduc-
tion of a the political distortion can match the procyclical policies observed in developing
countries, when political polarization is su¢ ciently high ( is su¢ ciently low).
5 Conclusions
Imperfections in capital markets are frequently assumed to be the main culprit for the pro-
cyclicality of scal policy in developing countries. The volatile business cycle environment
in developing countries is also often cited. The theory presented here raises questions re-
garding the power of these explanations. It provides an alternative political explanation
and demonstrates that polarized political environments may yield procyclical scal policies.
Quantitative simulations of the model are able to capture a number of the salient di¤erences
in the cyclicality of scal policy across countries.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Proposition 1: Assuming i.i.d. shocks and  (1 + r) < 1,Pareto-e¢ cient scal policy is
countercyclical in the following sense:
(1) Debt is decreasing in wages in all three regimes
(2) Transfers are decreasing in wages in the SWF regime.
(3) Tax rates (and revenues) are increasing in wages in the Fiscal Crisis regime.
(The results are comparative statics results.)
Proof. We write the problem in recursive form as follows:
V (b; w) = max
TA;TB ; ;b0
u
 
TAs ;  s

+ (1  )u  TBs ;  s+ EV (b0; w0) (A1.1)
s.t.
b0 + w"+1 (1  )"   TA + (1   )TB + (1 + r) b+ g
and
T i  0 8i
If the value function V (b; w) is to have the standard properties as in Stokey, Lucas and
Prescott (1989) (pp. 84, theorem 4.11), the period return function u^ (b0; b; w) implied by
this problem must be continuously di¤erentiable. There are several sets on fb; wg where
potential non-di¤erentiabilities might be present. These are at the transitions between the
three regimes. We can think of the function V (b; w) as being a sum of three separate
value functions, each for one of the scal regimes, with each non-zero only in the relevant
subset of the state space. The function V (b; w) is continuously di¤erentiable if the limits of
the di¤erentials of these three functions are equal at all intersection points. The envelope
theorem can be applied to each one of the three value functions, in the relevant region of the
state space. In all three cases, we obtain:
Vb (b; w) =   (1 + r) ; (A1.2)
where  is the Lagrange multiplier on the governments budget constraint. Without loss of
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generality, let group A be the transfer recipient in the Redistributive regime. The rst order
conditions of the governments maximization problem (see below) imply:
 = w"+1 (1  )" 1  
1     "
X
i2fA;Bg
i
"
[(1  )w]"+1
"+ 1
+ T i
# 
;
where A   and B  1   . This function is continuous at both TA = 0 and TB = 0.
The function V (b; w) is then continuously di¤erentiable over the entire state space. There is
no guarantee that V (b; w) is twice di¤erentiable. This is not a specic feature of this model.
It is in general di¢ cult to establish that the value function is twice di¤erentiable in a large
class of recursive models. The objective function is strictly concave and the set dened by
the governments budget constraint is compact, so the value function is (decreasing in and)
concave in b. In the analysis that follows, we will casually use the second derivatives of the
value function. In doing so, we follow Sargent (1979), who argues that even if a concave
value function is not di¤erentiable, one can view such casual di¤erentiation as a the limit of
nite di¤erences.
The rst order conditions of (A1.1) with respect to T i and  are:
ii    i + i = 0; (A1.3)
where  A   and  B  1   , and
 =
1  
1     "
X
i2fA;Bg
ii; (A1.4)
respectively, where
i 
"
[(1  )w]"+1
"+ 1
+ T i
# 
:
Here,  is the Lagrange multiplier on the governments budget constraint and i are the
Lagrange multipliers on the non-negativity constraints on T i. The rst order condition with
respect to b0 is:
EVb (b
0; w0) +  = 0: (A1.5)
In addition, applying the envelope theorem to (A1.1) gives (A1.2). Using the envelope
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theorem, (A1.5) can be rewritten as:
 =  (1 + r)E0;
so that  follows a martingale. Thus if  (1 + r) = 1; the economy converges almost surely
to the SWF regime and as is common in small open economy models assets grow without a
bound. We assume that  (1 + r) < 1, so that assets remain bounded, but also assume that
 (1 + r) is su¢ ciently close to 1 so that borrowing constraints are binding infrequently. In
the current analysis, we focus on periods when the borrowing constraint is not binding.
We now analyze the comparative statics of the model, looking at the change in policy
variables as w increases. We begin with the SWF regime. Here (A1.3) gives:
A +  EVb (b
0; w0) = 0
(1  )B + (1   )EVb (b0; w0) = 0;
while the governments budget constraint can be rewritten as:
b0   TA + (1   )TB + (1 + r) b+ g:
Here i =
h
[(1 )w]"+1
"+1
+ T i
i 
. The assumption of i.i.d shocks implies
@Vb (b
0; w0)
@w
= 0:
the current wage shock a¤ects the future marginal value of wealth only through the accu-
mulation or decumulation of debt. Comparative statics on these three equations give:
db0
dw
=
w" (1  )"+1

1  
1 
 
A
 +1
 +  

 
B
 +1


(1   )EVbb (b0; w0)  
 
AB
 +1


 SWF
< 0;
where
 SWF  
 
A
 +1



 
B
 +1
   (1   ) 1   
1  EVbb (b
0; w0)

    B +1  

EVbb (b
0; w0) > 0:
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Having determined that debt is countercyclical, di¤erentiating the budget constraint with
respect to w gives:
dT
dw
=  
dTA
dw
+ (1   ) dT
B
dw
=
db0
dw
< 0;
so that total transfers are countercyclical. This concludes the proof of part (2) of the propo-
sition.
We now turn to the Fiscal Crisis regime. Here, (A1.4) can be rewritten as:
1  
1     " + EVb (b
0; w0) = 0;
where i =  
h
[(1 )w]"+1
"+1
i 
8i, while the budget constraint becomes:
b0 + w"+1 (1  )" = (1 + r) b+ g:
Comparative statics give
@
@w
=
1
 fc

 ("+ 1)
w
  ("+ 1)w" (1  )" 1 (1     ") EVbb (b0; w0)

> 0;
where
 fc   ("+ 1)
1   +
"
(1  ) (1     ")
 "w" (1  )" 1 (1     ")EVbb (b0; w0) > 0:
Di¤erentiating the budget constraint with respect to w then gives that
db0
dw
< 0:
Thus tax policy is procyclical and debt countercyclical in the Fiscal Crisis regime. This
concludes the proof of part (3) of the proposition.
We have seen that debt is countercyclical in the SWF and Fiscal Crisis regimes. To
conclude the proof of part (1) of the proposition, we now look at theRedistributive regime.
Here, the rst order conditions can be rearranged to yield:
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A +  EVb (b
0; w0) = 0
(1  )B + 

1     "
1      

EVb (b
0; w0) = 0 (A1.6)
b0 +  (1  )"w" =  TA + (1 + r) b+ g:
Comparative statics now give:
db0
dw
=

 
A
 +1
 w" (1  )"
 R

w"+1 (1  )" (1  )  B +1   "
(1  )2 ("+ 1) EVb (b
0; w0)

   
 R
w" (1  )"+1   A +1 "
(1  )2EVb (b
0; w0) < 0;
where
 R   
 
A
 +1


 (1  )  B +1 w"+1 (1  )"   "
(1  )2EVb (b
0; w0)

+
 
A
 +1
 w"+1 (1  )"

1     "
1  

1     "
1      

EVbb (b
0; w0)
+ 

 (1  )  B +1 w"+1 (1  )"   "
(1  )2EVb

 EVbb (b
0; w0) :
 R < 0. Note that the second line of this denition is negative because (A1.6) implies that
1  "
1  >  in the Redistributive regime. This concludes part (1) of the proposition.
6.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Proposition 2: For a given level of inherited debt bt 1, if borrowing constraints are binding
for some wage realizations, and slack for other wage realization, there exists a cuto¤ wage
~w (bt 1), below which borrowing constraints are binding and above which borrowing constraints
are slack.
Proof. First note that the natural debt limit will never be binding in equilibrium. A binding
natural debt limit puts a positive probability on a sequence where the government imposes
a tax rate of  = 1
1+"
in every subsequent period. (A1.4) then gives !1.
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We thus only consider the ad hoc borrowing constraint b0  b. For a given level of inher-
ited debt, b, dene ~w (bt 1) as either (1) the wage realization for which b0 = b is the solution
to the governments maximization problem, without the ad-hoc borrowing constraint; or (2)
the wage lowest wage realization for which b0 < b, if there is no wage rate for which b0 = b
is the optimal choice. Proposition 1 shows that b0 is decreasing in w. Thus 8w > ~w (b) it
must be the case that b0 < b. In case (1), 8w < ~w (b) ; Proposition 1 implies that the optimal
choice of b0 is b0 > b, so that the borrowing constraint is binding. In case (2), 8w < ~w (b),
the borrowing constraint is binding by the denition of ~w. Thus borrowing constraints are
binding for all wage realizations w < ~w (b) ; but slack for all w > ~w (b).
6.3 Derivation of the Generalized Euler Equation
We begin by rewriting the two value functions, assuming a di¤erentiable policy function
b0 = f (b; w):
V (b; w) = max
;T;b0
u (T; ) +  [pEV (b0; w0) + (1  p)EW (b0; w0)]
s.t.
b0 + w"+1 (1  )" = T
2
+ (1 + r) b+ g;
T  0;
and
W (b; w) = u (T ;  )+(1  )u (0;  )+ [(1  p)EV (f (b; w) ; w0) + pEW (f (b; w) ; w0)] ;
where T ,   and f (b; w) are the solutions to the maximization problem above. We now
di¤erentiate the two functions, without applying the envelope theorem15. Beginning with
V (b; w) ;
Vb (b; w) = uT (T; )
@T
@b
+u (T; )
@
@b
+ [pEVb (f (b; w) ; w
0) + (1  p)EWb (f (b; w) ; w0)] fb (b; w) :
15We do so although it is easy to see, and we will verify, that the envelope theorem does apply in the case
of V (b; w).
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Using the denition (3) and equation (4) this reads:
Vb (b; w) = 

@T
@b
  w"+1 (1  )" @
@b

+ [pEVb (f (b; w) ; w
0) + (1  p)EWb (f (b; w) ; w0)] fb (b; w) :
(A3.1)
Next, di¤erentiate the governments budget constraint with respect to b:
fb (b; w) + w
"+1 (1  )" 1     "
1  
@
@b
=
1
2
@T
@b
+ (1 + r) :
Now note that whenever T  0 is binding, @T
@b
= 0 and whenever T > 0, @
@b
= 0, and
1  "
1  =
1
2
as (17) conrms. This last equation can then be written as
fb (b; w) =
1     "
1  

@T
@b
  w"+1 (1  )" @
@b

+ (1 + r) : (A3.2)
Plugging this back into (A3.1) yields:
Vb (b; w) = 
1     "
1   [fb (b; w)  (1 + r)]
+ [pEVb (f (b; w) ; w
0) + (1  p)EWb (f (b; w) ; w0)] fb (b; w) :
Replacing (18) into the second line of this equation, and using (19) in the rst gives:
Vb (b; w) =  [fb (b; w)  (1 + r)]  fb (b; w) =   (1 + r) : (A3.3)
It is reassuring that this result is identical to the application of the envelope theorem to
V (b; w) ; as the envelope theorem should apply in this case. We now turn to W (b; w) where
the envelope theorem does not apply.
Wb (b; w) = uT (T; )
@T
@b
+ u (T; )
@
@b
+ (1  )u (0; ) @
@b
+ [(1  p)EVb (f (b; w) ; w0) + pEWb (f (b; w) ; w0)] fb (b; w) :
We can use (A3.2) to obtain
Wb (b; w) =  [fb (b; w)  (1 + r)]  + (1  )u (0; ) @
@b
+ [(1  p)EVb (f (b; w) ; w0) + pEWb (f (b; w) ; w0)] fb (b; w) :
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Now note that when T > 0; @
@b
= 0, so that the second term is equal to zero. On the other
hand, when T = 0, u (0; ) =  w"+1 (1  )"  while (A3.2) reads:
fb (b; w) =  1     "
1   w
"+1 (1  )" @
@b
+ (1 + r) ;
giving:
Wb (b; w) =  [(1  p)EVb (f (b; w) ; w0) + pEWb (f (b; w) ; w0)] fb (b; w)
+

[fb (b; w)  (1 + r)]  for T = 0
 [fb (b; w)  (1 + r)]  for T > 0 :
Analyzing the rst line of this equation gives:
 [(1  p)EVb (f (b; w) ; w0) + pEWb (f (b; w) ; w0)] fb (b; w)
= 
p
1  p
"
(1  p)2
p
EVb (f (b; w) ; w
0) + (1  p)EWb (f (b; w) ; w0)
#
fb (b; w)
=   p
1  p

 +  (1 + r)
1  2p
p
E0

fb (b; w) ;
using (A3.3) and (18) in the last step. This gives
Wb (b; w) =   p
1  p

 +  (1 + r)
1  2p
p
E0

fb (b; w) (A3.4)
+

[fb (b; w)  (1 + r)]  for T = 0
 [fb (b; w)  (1 + r)]  for T > 0 :
We now use (A3.3) and this last equation in (18) to obtain:
 =  (1 + r)
Z
w0jT 0=0
0dw0 + (p+  (1  p))
Z
w0jT 0>0
0dw0

+ (1  p)
24 (1  p)  (1 + r)E [00fb (b0; w0)] 

R
w0jT 0>0 fb (b
0; w0) 0dw0 +
R
w0jT 0=0 fb (b
0; w0) 0dw0
 35
 p fp (1 + r)E [00fb (b0; w0)]  E [0fb (b0; w0)]g ;
which gives the GEE.
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6.4 Computational Algorithm
We solve a nite horizon variant of the model using backward induction. Let t be the
foresight horizon of the modelthe number of periods from time t = 0 the end of history. We
simulate the model over tsim periods, where tsim < t. The model is solved computationally
as follows.
1. Create a grid on w and b.
2. History ends at time t. All outstanding debt bt 1 must be repaid: bt = 0. The
governments time t maximization problem is:
V
t (bt 1; wt) = max
 t;Tt
u (Tt;  t) :
s.t.
 t (1   t)"w"+1t = (1 + r) bt 1 +
Tt
2
+ g;
giving the solutions  t (bt 1; wt) and T

t (bt 1; wt). This problem is solved for each grid
point on fb; wg : The opposition partys value can then be calculated via
W
t (bt 1; wt) = u (T t ; 

t ) + (1  )u (0; ) :
3. Iterate back from t 1 to zero. For each t 2 [0; t  1] the incumbent takes the resulting
value functions from the pervious step, V t+1 (bt; wt+1) and W t+1 (bt; wt+1) ; as given.
The incumbent solves
V t (bt 1; wt) = max
 t;Tt;bt+1
u (Tt;  t) + 

pEV t+1 (bt; wt+1) + (1  p)EW t+1 (bt; wt+1)

s.t.
bt+1 +  t (1   t)"w"+1t = (1 + r) bt +
Tt
2
+ g;
giving  t (bt 1; wt), T

t (bt 1; wt) and b

t (bt 1; wt) : The oppositions value function is
given by:
W t (bt 1; wt) = u (T t ; 

t )+(1  )u (0;  t )+ [(1  p)EV (bt ; wt+1) + pEW (bt ; wt+1)] :
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4. Repeat step 3 until t = 0, or until V t = V t+1 and W t = W t+1, in which case the value
functions have converged.
We simulate the model with 1000 grid points for b, between [ 2; bmax], where bmax is the
highest level that can be repaid almost surely or the ad hoc debt limit, whichever is smaller.
The lower bound on debt (upper bound on assets) is never binding. Five grid points are
used for z, giving ve grid points for w = ez. The grid points are chosen using the method
of Hussey and Tauchen (1991), whose method we also use to convert the AR(1) process into
a discrete Markov chain. The reported simulations have t = 10; 000 and tsim = 1000. The
simulationsresults remain unchanged when t = 1; 000; 000. The rst 900 simulated periods
are discarded, to minimize the e¤ects of initial conditions, and moments are calculated using
the remaining 100 periods.
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High-Income Countries Developing Countries
Total Government 
Expenditure -.12 .37
Government 
Consumption .21 .23
Government Capital 
Formation .29 .30
Government Interest 
Expenditure .29 .30
High-Income Countries Latin America
Social Security 
Transfers -.26 .11
Cyclical component estimated using Hodrick-Prescott filter with a smoothing parameter of 100 (annual data)
Source: Interest expenditure and social security transfers for Latin America from the 
International Monetary Fund's Government Finance Statistics. Social social security transfers for high-income 
countires and corresponding real GDP are from the OECD. All other data are from IMF WEO.
Correlations are between 1970 and 2003.
 n=81 for developing countries and n=21 for high-income countries, except capital expenditures where 
the number of observations is for high-income countries drops to 20.
For interest expenditrures n=20 for high-income countries and n=66 for developing countries. 
For interest expenditures, the time period of the correlation varies from country to country.
Latin American countries included in the sample are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Panama
Paraguay and Uruguay.
Table I
Components of Government Expenditure
Average correlation of cyclical component with the cyclical component of GDP
 
Developing Countries
All Periods                                             .37
Excluding Crises .33
Periods with Ouptut 
Above Trend .25
Periods with Ouptut 
Below Trend .29
Cyclical component estimated using Hodrick-Prescott filter with a smoothing parameter of 100 (annual data)
Source: IMF WEO. Correlations are between 1970 and 2003.
Crisis periods are defined as periods when the cyclical component of GDP is 
two standard deviations below trend or lower. 
n=81
Table II
Correlation between Government Expenditures and GDP
Comparison along the business cycle
 
 
Countries with 
countercyclical 
government 
expenditures
Countries with 
procyclical 
government 
expenditures
.26   (.052) .49   (.029)
n 20 82
Source: Fractionalization data from Alesina et al (2003). 
Fiscal data is in annual frequency from IMF WEO. Correlations are between 1970 and 2003.
Cyclical components estimated using a Hodrick-Prescott filter. 
Table 3
Average Ethnic Fractionalization
Standard Errors in Parenthesis
 
Parameter Value                  (U.S./Argentina) Source
σ .0144 / .079 Cooley and Precott (1995), adapted to annual data / Author's 
estimate from IMF WEO data
ρ 0.81 / 0.56 Cooley and Precott (1995), adapted to annual data / Author's 
estimate from IMF WEO data
γ 2
ε 1.7 Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Huffman (1998)
r 2.4% /  6.4%
 Average annual real yield on 10-year U.S. Treasury Bonds 
(source: IMF) augmented by 400 basis points which was a 
typical bond spread for Latin American Economies in the 
1990s (Table 3 in Eichengreen and Mody (1998) ) 
β 0.976 / .934
Set to match the average debt-to-GDP ratios between 1970 
and 2003 of 43% in the U.S. (source: Congressional Budget 
Office) / 19% in Argentina (source: World Bank Debt Tables 
and IFS). 
g/GDP 11%  /  4.5% Average central government consumption as a percent of GDP over the period in the U.S./Argentina
p 0.9  / 0.8 Average probability that incumbent's party retains office in a given year  in the U.S. / Argentina in the 20th century.
Table IV
Parameter Values
 
Figure I: Cyclicality of Government Expenditures vs. GDP per Capita
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HP-filtered cyclical components of total real central government expenditures and real GDP from 1970 to 2003, using 
IMF WEO data. PPP GDP per capita in US$ in 1970 is from the Heston, Summers, and Aten (2002) database.
Figure II: Cyclicality of Government Revenues vs. GDP per Capita
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HP-filtered cyclical components of total real central government revenues and real GDP from 1970 to 2003, using IMF 
WEO data. PPP GDP per capita in US$ in 1970 is from the Heston, Summers, and Aten (2002) database.
Figure III: Cyclicality of Government Surplus vs. GDP per Capita
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HP-filtered cyclical components of  total real central government surplus and real GDP from 1970 to 2003, using IMF 
WEO data. PPP GDP per capita in US$ in 1970 is from the Heston, Summers, and Aten (2002) database.
Figure IV: Cyclicality of Government Expenditures 
vs. Ethnic Fractionalization
-1
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Ethnic Fractionalization
C
o
r
r
.
 
(
G
o
v
.
 
E
x
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e
s
,
 
G
D
P
)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.
HP-filtered cyclical components of total real central government expenditures and real GDP from 1970 to 2003, using 
IMF WEO data. Ethnic fractionalization index from Alesina et al (2003)
Figure V: Government Expenditures and Political Cohesion
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Figure VI: Government Revenues and Political Cohesion
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Figure VII: Government Deficit and Political Cohesion
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Figure VIII: Government Expenditures and Political Cohesion
 Comparing Values of p
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p = 0.8 p = 0.7 p = 0.9 Argentina Actual
U.S. Actual p = 0.95 p = 0.5
